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Abstract
Electric power-systems are one of the most important critical infrastructures.
In recent years, they have been exposed to extreme stress due to the increas-
ing demand, the introduction of distributed renewable energy sources, and the
development of extensive interconnections. We investigate the phenomenon of
abrupt breakdown of an electric power-system under two scenarios: load growth
(mimicking the ever-increasing customer demand) and power fluctuations (mim-
icking the effects of renewable sources). Our results indicate that increasing the
system size causes breakdowns to become more abrupt; in fact, mapping the
system to a solvable statistical-physics model indicates the occurrence of a first
order transition in the large size limit. Such an enhancement for the systemic
risk failures (black-outs) with increasing network size is an effect that should be
considered in the current projects aiming to integrate national power-grids into
”super-grids”.
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1. Introduction
The electrical power system (EPS) is crucial for the well functioning of most
critical infrastructures like telecommunications, banking systems, oil and gas
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pumping, water distribution [1]. Since their first appearance in 1881 at Go-
dalming in England, EPSs have evolved into one of the most well engineered
and robust network infrastructure; nevertheless power outages do occur with a
likelihood larger than what would be naively expected. In particular, historical
data show that outages’ empirical probability distribution has fat tails [2, 3],
corresponding to a non-vanishing risk of system-wide failures (major outages or
black-outs) causing disruption and economic damages.
Black-outs often occur as a cascading sequence of failures and automatic dis-
connections triggered by an apparently minor initiating event; no two cascading
outages are the same [4]. The mechanisms driving the tripping (disconnections)
sequences are manifold and comprise the overloading of line and/or generators,
frequency imbalances and transient currents. A black-out happens when the
time-scales of automatic reactions are way to fast to correct the process by
human intervention.
In order to predict and control the system, power engineers have developed
and are refining sophisticated systems to simulate the full dynamics of whole
power systems; moreover, distributed metering is going to furnish detailed data
for the energy consumption at the household level. Nevertheless, black-outs
still occur and understanding the nature of such occurrences is still an open
problem. A general question is whether such large outages can be partially due
to emergent behaviour in the EPSs: if this would be the case, increasing the
accuracy of power systems’ simulation would not result in better predictions of
black-outs. The fact that EPSs are aggregations of large number of simple units
makes them an ideal candidate to be a system exhibiting additional complexity
as a whole beyond what is dictated by the simple sum of its parts.
To highlight the possibility of emergent behaviour, it is first necessary to
simplify the system in order to understand the basic mechanisms that could
drive systemic behaviour. We will hence introduce a simplified model of EPS
that is amenable of both simulation on realistic grids and of a self-consistent
analytical solution. We will then consider the behaviour of such a model under
two kinds of stress: (1) an increasing growth of the loads, mimicking the case
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of EPS that are operated to the limit of their capacities in order to maximize
profits and (2) fluctuations in demands and generation, mimicking the effects of
the steady penetrations of the erratic renewable sources. This latter case if of
particular interest since the effects and consequences of introducing in the grids
new erratic sources have not yet been fully understood.
2. Overload Cascade Model
A particular source of stress to EPS comes to the fact that adjustments in
power generation are not real-time but follow fixed time schedules; for exam-
ple, in Europe the production is fixed in advance the day before and periodic
adjustments happen every 15 minutes; therefore, the reaction time (apart from
automatic controls/tripping) is generally much higher than the time of propa-
gation of electrical perturbation in the system.
The tripping of lines and generators above their operating limits induced by
automatic protective equipments is common to all kinds of cascading outages;
while this process is intended to protect costly equipments from damage, it can
potentially widen cascade failures [4].
Most of the cascade model for power grids are purely topological models
based on the local redistribution of power loads upon failure [5, 6, 7, 8] and
disregard the long range nature of electricity. On one hand, a clear signature of
the non-locality of power outages can be found in real data: this is, for example,
the case of the tripping sequence of the Western Interconnection WSCC system
disturbances in July 2-3, 1996 [9], where the occurrence of subsequent failures
in far away lines can be observed. On the other hand, it is possible to have
simple yet realistic models respecting Kirchoff laws, like the overload cascade
model (OCM) introduced by Pahwa et al [10].
In Pahwa’s model, an initial power flow configuration is calculated using the
DC power flow model[11]; link capacities (i.e. the maximum of power-flow before
a link failure) is proportional to the initial flow on the branch and is usually
assumed to be 10% higher than the initial flow. Notice that this condition is
3
equivalent to the normal bounds assumed for the validity of the DC power flow
model. To understand what happens when the system is subject to stress, a
new configuration of loads is assumed and power flows recalculated. If the load
on a line goes beyond its capacity, the line trips (disconnects) and power flows
are recalculated on the new topology (i.e. the grid MINUS the tripped lines).
Such procedure is repeated until convergence. Notice that OCM is a simplified
version of the dynamic OPA model introduced by Carreras et al [12] that is also
based on DC power flow equations but uses linear optimization for generation
dispatch after each link failure step. Further simulation evidence of the nature
of a phase transition associated to load increases can be found in [13, 14].
3. Equal load-sharing model
The OCM model, as several similar ones, is based on DC power flow’s equa-
tions. In the DC power flow, the grid is described by matrix Yij measuring
the the admittance of the M edges (branches) ij among N nodes (buses). The
power injected (generators) or absorbed (loads) on the i-th bus is described by
the vector Pi. The variables describing the electric state of the systems are the
phase angles θi at the buses that are linearly related to the injected powers:
L~θ = ~P (1)
where L is the Laplacian associated with the admittance matrix Y . Power flows
along branches are proportional to the phase-angle differences θij = θi − θj .
Since eq. (1) is in the form of a Laplacian, the interactions among phase
angles θi is long range; in fact, similar equations hold to describe resistor network
models [15] or simplified fracture models [16]. Hence, when an edge breaks down
in such kind of systems, the stress it was carrying (in our case the load flow)
will redistribute among all the remaining edges. To capture the above effect, we
can hence develop a mean-field model of the OCM by assuming that the load
carried by a tripped line gets equally shared among all the remaining links: we
call such a model the Equal Load-Share model (ELSM) of cascading failures in
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power grids. Notice that such an approximation corresponds to the one of the
so-called democratic fiber-bundle model of fractures [17, 18].
In the ELSM, we consider M lines where each line e is characterised by
its capacity (i.e. the maximum amount of power flow) Ce; by simplicity, we
assume that such capacities are characterised by a probability distribution p (C).
Also the initial stresses le on the lines can be characterised by a probability
distribution q (l). The ELSM dynamics then follows the same dynamics of
the OCM: when the load of a line surpasses its capacity, the line breaks; the
characteristic of the ELSM is that such load gets equally redistributed among
all the remaining surviving links.
3.1. Uniform Stress
We first consider a uniform stress situation, where the system is subject
to an overall load L and all the links are initially subject to the same load
l0 = L/M . The fraction of links f1 =
∫ L/M
0
p (C) dC immediately fails since
their thresholds are less than the load l they sustain. Hence, after the first stage
of a cascade, there are M1 = (1 − f1)M surviving links and the new load per
link is l1 = L/M1. The following cascade’s stages follow analogously; we can
thus write the mean field equations for the (t+ 1)-the stage of the cascade:
lt+1 = L/M t
f t+1 = P
(
lt+1
)
M t+1 =
(
1− f t+1)M
(2)
with initial conditions lt=0 = L/M , f t=0 = 1, M t=0 = M and where P (x) =∫ x
0
p (C) dC is the cumulative distribution function associated to p(C). Eq. 2
can be simplified in a single equation for the fraction f of failed links
f t+1 = P
(
L
(1− f t)M
)
(3)
and the fix-point
f∗ = P
[
L
(1− f∗)M
]
(4)
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represents the total fraction of links broken by the failure cascade. The
behaviour of f∗ depends on the functional form of p (C) [19] and is known to
present a first order transition for a wide family of curves. Notice that the total
load stays constant during the cascades process, while in real networks total load
decreases as soon as link failures disconnect a node asking power. Moreover,due
to the mean-field nature of the approximation, no islanding phenomena are
considered.
To mimic the functional form of the distribution for the thresholds C in
the case of realistic power networks, we analyse the OCM thresholds’ frequency
distribution for several IEEE networks. We find that such histograms can be
approximated by p’s of the form
p (c) ∼ c−γ for cmin < c < 1 (5)
where c are the normalised line capacities c = C/Cmax and Cmax is the maxi-
mum line capacity of the network. For all the networks we find that cmin ∼ 0.02
and that the exponent γ increases according to the size. In fact, in [20] it is
show that the histograms for the IEEE 14 bus network have approximately a
flat distribution with γ ∼ 0, while already for the IEEE 247 bus network the
distribution has a sharp decrease with γ ∼ 2. Notice that the distribution de-
scribed by eq. 5 are not truly power-law distributions since the maximum line
capacity Cmax is not growing with the system size since is limited by the maxi-
mum power a real cable can hold. Notice that since power grids are topologically
sparse graphs, i.e. the number of edges M is proportional through a small factor
(the average degree) to the number of nodes N [21], both such quantities can
be used as a proxy for the system size.
In fig. 1 we show the results of the ELSM by plotting the fix-point of equation
4) for the extreme cases of a flat distribution (γ = 0) and of a sharp decrease in
the distribution (γ = 2). In both cases we find a marked jump due to the first
order of the transition. We observe that higher values of γ makes the network
more fragile, i.e. there is a bigger jump and less links break before the tran-
sition; moreover, the system breaks down at a lower stress threshold l∗. Such
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a behaviour is to be expected since for larger γ there is an higher fraction of
links with a very low threshold that are going to fail all together at the initial
stages of the cascades and will inflict a higher damage than the case of a uni-
form distribution γ = 0. Such effect could indicate that interconnecting power
networks could increase their fragility; in fact, such process often corresponds
to adding few high capacity lines, i.e. ”lowering the tail” of the normalised
capacity distribution p (c).
An artificial effect due to the mean-field spirit of the model is the fact that,
after the threshold l∗, the system breaks down completely (f = 1). This is
not to be expected in realistic grids, where the system can often break down in
islands [20].
Notice that the ELSM shares the same mean-field spirit of the CASCADE
model for black-outs [22, 23]; while the ELS model assumes a starting situation
in which thresholds are randomly distributed, CASCADE assumes that the
thresholds are the same. As shown by [19], the different behaviour of ELSM and
CASCADE (presenting respectively a first order and a second order transition)
can be imputed to the different functional form of the p (C) for the two models.
However, recent analysis on black-outs’ sizes in several countries indicates that
causal factors other than the self-organization or a critical state predicted by
CASCADE might be significantly ruling the system dynamics [3].
Random stress
The case in which there are also fluctuations in the initial loads cannot be
described by a single equation for average quantities: in fact, the failure of a line
e will depend on both its capacity and the specific stress applied. However, the
fraction f of broken links for such a case can be solved numerically by iterating
the following algorithm:
T ← ∅ (set of tripped lines)
S ← 0 (magnitude of redistributed stress)
repeat
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∆S ← 0
Ma ←M − |T | (number of active lines)
for all le + S/Ma > Ce , e ∈ {T do
∆S ← ∆S + le
T ← T ∪ {e}
end for
S ← S + ∆S
until ∆S = 0
For the sake of simplicity, we will consider a case in which the initial loads
l0e are uniformly distributed among 0 and 2l, i.e. the fluctuations σ = l/
√
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of the initial loads are of the same order of magnitude the average initial load
l. Notice that the case σ = 0, l = L0/M recovers the previous case solved by
eq. (3). By solving numerically such system at finite M for different several
realizations of the initial loads, we find that the transition does not happen any
more at a critical value of l but can occur in a region around the mean-field
prediction. As an example, we show in fig. 2 the results for 10 realizations of
the initial loads in a system of M = 1000 links.
We notice that in presence of disorder makes the transition point at which
the abrupt cascade happens can vary inside a region. To investigate such effect,
we investigate the variation of the size of such a region with the system size,
where we use the number of edges M as a measure of the system size. We find
that the distribution of failure points (i.e. the critical loads at which the system
breaks down) follows a Gaussian distribution in presence of disorder. Hence,
we identify the width W of the transition region with the variance V ar (l∗) =√〈
(l∗)2
〉
− 〈l∗〉2 of the transition point. In fig. 3 we show that the width W
calculated over several configuration of disorders goes to zero with the system
size M approximatively as M−1/2.
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4. Conclusion
Statistical mechanics represent a useful framework for studying and analysing
structure, dynamics and evolution of many complex systems[24]. In this paper
we have introduced a solvable model of cascading failure of power grids that
captures the long-range interactions of the electric system. Such model predicts
that cascading failures are a first order phenomena, i.e. the system abruptly
breaks down when stressed. Such abrupt failures are very difficult to predict
since they often come without showing precursor signs. Moreover, we analise
such model in presence of randomness in the stresses: in such a case, we find
that the abrupt breakdown does not happen at a single point but can happen
in a whole region where the system is unpredictable, i.e. can be either safe or
totally wrecked depending on the actual stresses applied to the system. Nev-
ertheless, the width of such region seems to go to zero with the system size M
in our mean-field approximation. As a limitation, the mean-field character of
the model fails to capture the possible fragmentation (akin to the programmed
islanding used to isolate large black-outs) that can stop cascading failures in real
systems and planar networks. Given the difficulty of predicting such ruptures
in the system, a possible approach would be to introduce dynamic strategies
in the system like the self-healing procedures outlined by Quattrociocchi et al.
[25].
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Figure 1: ELSM first order transition in the fraction of failed links calculated via eq. (4)
versus the initial overall load of the system. Left panel: the case of uniform line capacities
p (c) = const. Right panel: the case of line capacities distributed according to p (c) = c−2.
Figure 2: Behaviour of the fraction f of failed links versus the average stress l for 10
realizations of the disorder in a system with M = 103 links (simulations follow the algorithm
of sec.III. Notice that the breakdown of the system does not happen at a single point but in
a region around the critical point of the non-disordered system.
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Figure 3: The width W of the region where the random system can break down can be
measured by the variance
√〈
(l∗)2
〉
− 〈l∗〉2 of the set of point where the system breaks down
when submitted to random stresses. We find that the width W goes to zero approximately
as M−1/2; hence in bigger systems the transition region shrinks toward a single point.
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